Third Strategic Dialogue and Pak-US relationship

If artificial smiles of cordiality, genial and firm handshakes, numerous photo-ops, vows of everlasting friendship and hollow promises for the future are considered the only parameters for success of diplomatic negotiations between high-ranking officials of two countries, then the third round of strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States, at Washington DC, has largely been a great achievement. If this round of negotiations between two nations, both playing a decisive role in the fate of terrorism, are evaluated against the facts and practicalities, then finding a ray of hope for peace and stability in the destabilised part of South Asia is little less than a Herculean task.

The latest round of strategic dialogue between America and Pakistan does not offer any hint for constructive change in the violent situation of the region, thus resulting in challenges for Pakistan. We cannot say, in the continuing peace process in Afghanistan (which also includes underground negotiations with the Taliban), what the nature of Pakistan's role will be, and if their legitimate security concerns will be addressed. Before the mid-term elections in the United States, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Pakistani officials to make 'difficult decisions' and go after the Taliban. Before the US president's official visit to India, the Obama administration remained silent on the question of US role in resolving the Kashmir issue, despite the requests of the Pakistani foreign minister. Absence of any substance, except a $2 billion military package, during the news conference of Hillary Clinton and Shah Mahmood Qureshi, is enough to suggest that a collision of interests and differences in priorities still exists.

Military aid worth $2 billion is intended to enable the Pak Army to purchase indispensable military equipment from the United States, to effectively operate against the Taliban and associates of al-Qaeda, but the timeframe of this aid package makes us wonder if the US really wishes Pakistan to take decisive action against the well-funded and sufficiently-equipped militants. A five year aid package, from 2012 to 2016, by the Obama administration, which has made it very clear on many occasions that it will start to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of July 2011, poses some new questions. If the United States is really serious about accomplishing its mission by the middle of next year, then allied forces, during the next eight months, will try to hit the Taliban hard, so that the US may reap as many advantages as possible. In the same period, on the other hand, to keep the Pak Army insufficiently equipped against sophisticated al-Qaeda suggests murky developments.

This conception is further empowered by the fact that the US has yet to pay Pakistan its share of $2 billion, a smaller part of operational expenses which the US pays annually as a partner in the war on terror. During the third round of strategic dialogue no reference was made to this by the US administration, despite the fact that the Pakistan Army has paid not only for its own part, but also for that of the US. In addition, the US has linked the humanitarian aid for flood victims with the civilian aid to be delivered under the Karry-Lugar bill. It means the US will not pay any additional amount for the rehabilitation of flood affectees.

The above-mentioned facts make it clear that at a time when war on terror has entered a final and decisive phase, Pakistan is being denied any substantial help to stand firmly. Also, the Pakistan Army, which is basically trained and organised to handle aggression along Eastern borders, is being forced to take decisive action against militants in North Waziristan. A military operation in North Waziristan has the potential to put financially weak Pakistan and an inadequately equipped Pak Army (to fight against Taliban ) directly at war with the Taliban in Afghanistan. This possibility probably best explains the hesitation of the Pak Army, which is always mindful of aggression from Eastern borders, to start operations in North Waziristan.

Kashmir is the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan, and has caused three wars between these neighbouring countries. Until the Kashmir issue is resolved peacefully, neither the Pakistani nation nor Pakistan's armed forces can be at peace from its Eastern borders. An appeal made by Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi that the US plays its role to solve the longstanding issue of Kashmir, actually expresses Pakistan's seriousness towards peace in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army can take serious action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda when it has well-founded reasons to believe that sacredness of Eastern borders will not be violated. Thus demands made by the Obama administration, which clearly prefers Indian approval, at the expense of Kashmiri people and Pakistan's security concerns, are far from being realistic.

We make mistakes in moments, but we bear their results for years and decades to come. While envisaging new geo-political balance, it will be better for the US administration, regional stability and global peace not to ignore historical facts and geographical factors. Humans have a tendency not to learn from history, so history repeats itself. Barak Obama will be visiting India in November. During his stay in New Delhi, perhaps it will become clearer if he wishes to see history repeated, or prefers to alter its course.

( This article is also published on daily The Statesman on October 27, 2010 )
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Third Round of US-Pak Strategic dialogue October 2010; Hopes and Fears.

At the end of latest round of US-Pakistan strategic dialogue, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi at her side, announced a five year $ 2 billion aid package for Pakistan. She hoped that it will reassure Pakistan of the long term US commitment to Pakistan's military needs and will also empower Pakistan to go after Taliban and Al-Qaida affiliates on its territory. Exact terms of the deal are still being negotiated, the goal is to ramp up US military aid to Pakistan incrementally over the five year period. The amount will enable Pakistan to purchase US made arms, ammunition and accessories from 2012 to 2016.


The striking feature of this aid package is that Obama administration will refuse to train or equip those Army units which are believed to have killed unarmed prisoners and civilians during recent offensives against Taliban. New York Times sees this the cutoff of funds as "an unusual rebuke to a wartime ally, and it illustrates the growing tensions with a country that is seen as a pivotal partner, and sometimes impediment, in a campaign to root out and other militant groups". At the moment it is not sure - as process is not over yet, how many Army units will be denied of American equipment and training. However, it is very evident that some of the units, which successfully handled operations against Tliban, will not benefit from latest aid package.




The third round of the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue came as the countries tried to ease tensions after a NATO gunship helicopter killed three Pakistani paramilitary troops and Pakistan retaliated by shutting down a critical supply route to allied troops in Afghanistan. It must have provided an opportunity to the high-level administration on both sides to strengthen the working relationship.


White House, however, preferred to provide only a vague description of the conversations. Most of the strategic dialogue is focused on a range of subjects, including counterterrorism, nuclear security, flood relief and trade. After the announcement of the latest aid package, it becomes very celar that US will expect Pakistan to step up its efforts against those Talibans, which are fighting against allied forces in Afghanistan.

Pervez Musharraf, former Army Chief and president of Pakistan, has criticized American behavior towards Pakistan. While speaking at Chicago University, he said that Pakistanis has offered great sacrifices in the war against terror and they complain that US has failed to play a constructive role to resolve longstanding issues of Kashmir and Palestine. He said that Obama's decision to visit India, but not Pakistan, implies that US is not serious about Pakistan.


It may not be a coincidence that the third round of strategic dialogues happened before the mid-term elections in November 2010. If United States is serious about the war in Afghanistan than Pakistani administration also have serious concerns over its role in negotiating talibans, US role to resolve Kashmir problem, reconstruction of flood affected areas, Indian presence in Afghanistan and openness of American market to Pakistani products etc. The American warmness towards Pakistan, disregarding Pakistan's security interests, may only seem as an effort focused on satisfying disappointed US voters and thus will not be prone to bring any solid results.